Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated Foods Revisited by Hinnegan, K. A.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 17 Number 3 Article 3 
4-1-1968 
Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated 
Foods Revisited 
K. A. Hinnegan 
University of Western Ontario, School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons 
Recommended Citation 
K. A. Hinnegan, Potential Reciprocity and the Conglomerate Merger: Consolidated Foods Revisited, 17 
Buff. L. Rev. 631 (1968). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol17/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 




UI N 1959, comfortably en route to Richmond, Virginia, Paul L. Davies, chair-
I man and chief executive of the big conglomerate, Food Machinery and
Chemical Corp. (FMC), was both satisfied and expectant. His company's
machinery division had just received a $35 million contract from the Defense
Department for armored aluminum personnel carriers. Davies was on his way
to place with Reynolds Metals, at the time troubled by excess capacity, an
order for tons of aluminum plate.
"But Davies was going not only as a potential buyer. FMC's chemical divi-
sion is a large producer of soda ash and caustic, which are used in the making of
alumina. Davies was therefore looking forward to a mutually beneficial agree-
ment, in which he would place a large order for aluminum and would book in
return an order for the sale of substantial amounts of soda ash and caustic.
"On his arrival, Davies received a rude shock. Richard Reynolds told him
that the company had already made provision for its soda-ash requirements.
After dwelling on the size and importance of the order he had to place, Davies
returned to New York. He indicated that he would be awaiting some further
response from Reynolds before he settled on how he would parcel out his alu-
minum order among the major producers.
"As he guessed he would, Davies soon got the word he wanted. Reynolds
made some changes in its soda-ash arrangements. FMC could sell Reynolds quite
a bit of it, after all."'3
Mr. Davies might be surprised to know that he would fit the description
of one of those "underling tradesmen" that Adam Smith was berating when he
said: "It is the most underling tradesmen only who make it a rule to employ
chiefly their own customers. A great trader purchases his goods always where
they are cheapest and best, without regard to any little interest of this kind."'2
This cudgel, raised back in 1776 by Smith against what is today a very common
business practice among the "great traders" of American industry, has quite
recently been taken up again by the antitrust enforcement agencies. However,
the fact that this practice, known as "reciprocity," has only lately come under
increasing attack by the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice as an antitrust violation does not imply that it
* L.L.B., University of Western Ontario 1965, L.L.M., University of Chicago, 1967;
Assistant Professor, University of Western Ontario, School of Law.
1. McCreary & Guzzardi, A Customer is a Company's Best Friend, Fortune, June 1965,
180, at 181.
2. A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations 460 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1937).
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is new. It has been dated as far back as the Phoenician traders.8 The Wall
Street Journal has gone further and suggests that reciprocity is as old as busi-
ness itself.4 Regardless of its origin, there are indications that it has become a
very useful selling tool at every level of business, from the giant corporations
down to the corner grocer. In 1960, FMC executives claimed that during the
previous five years reciprocity had helped to increase its chemical division's
sales about 6 million-some fifteen percent-and that about fifty percent
of FMC's total 1958 sales were tied to reciprocal arrangements. "Buying from
those who buy from us gives the corporation the greatest benefit on major
contracts." 5 And it is a natural human reaction for the corner grocer to have his
teeth repaired by the dentist who buys his groceries at his store.
REcipRoCITY
Reciprocal dealing simply means, "If I patronize him, he will patronize
me," or, to express it in terms of its most common manifestation, "I will buy
from you, if you will buy from me." A more complex form of reciprocity,
referred to as "secondary reciprocity,"16 occurs where A buys from B because
C, who buys from A, sells to B.
7
The practice of reciprocity can be either tacit or overt, or, as defined by
one commentator, "psychological" or "coercive."18 Overt or coercive reciprocity
refers to explicit threats and promises designed to induce purchases by the
supplier; tacit or psychological reciprocity results from the inherent power of
a large customer, solely by virtue of the volume of his purchases, to influence
the purchases of his suppliers. Tacit reciprocity is said to be due to a "predilec-
tion of businessmen for an easy sale and the propensity to show gratitude to
those who have favored a seller with orders."9 It has been observed that busi-
ness reciprocity may significantly affect purchasing decisions even in the absence
of any overt coercion, and even, at times, without any explicit reference by
either party to the anticipated advantages of reciprocal purchases.' 0
Reciprocal buying is not the only form business reciprocity may take. In
general, the practice includes any type of mutual concession made by inde-
3. Address by George Miron, Assistant Chief, General Litigation Section, Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, Trade Relations Association Meeting, Sept. 18, 1963, at
1.
4. Swapping Business, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 4, 1963, at 1 col. 6.
5. Chemical Week, June 3, 1961, at 70.
6. Krash, The Legality of Reciprocity under Section I of the Clayton Act, 9 Antitrust
Bull. 93, 97 (1964); Ammer, Realistic Reciprocity, Harv. Bus. Rev., Jan.-Feb. 1962, 116,
119.
7. See, United States v. Ingersoll-Rand, 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), a.9'd, 320 F,2d
509 (3d Cir. 1963).
S. Krash, supra note 6, at 99.
9. Handler, Emerging Antitrust Issues: Reciprocity, Diversification and Joint Ventures,
49 Va. L. Rev. 433, 435 (1963).
10. Ammer, supra note 6, at 121; Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws,
77 Harv. L. Rev. 873, at 875, 877 (1964); Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the
Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. Chi. 73, 91-92 (1957).
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pendent firms to promote their business interests. This would include such
things as the reciprocal exchange of technology, the joint sharing of trans-
portation facilites, or the joint development of sources of raw material.,, How-
ever, the scope of the present discussion will be restricted principally to reci-
procal buying practices.
TRADE RELATIONS
While it may be difficult to accept the results of one survey that reciprocity
involved as much as twenty percent of the sales volume of the country in
1963,12 a concrete manifestation attesting to its widespread use has recently
emerged on the business scene. Today several large, diversified firms have special
departments, called "Trade Relations" or "Customer Relations,"'18 whose gen-
eral function is to supply the sales department with data on their own company's
purchases from each supplier to be used as a tool in persuading suppliers to
become customers. In 1965, about sixty percent of the companies on Fortune's
500 list had "trade relations men" who adroitly, and more or less openly, con-
ducted reciprocal affairs. 14 Some of these have even gone so far as to form a
trade association, called the Trade Relations Association, which as of the end
of 1963 had 113 members15 and had grown to 141 by 1965.16
The function of a trade relations man has been variously described. The
TR man of the U.S. Rubber Company defined it as "the means of dealing with
reciprocal possibilities through a process of valid management methods to sift
and consolidate total company resources and the use of purchasing, traffic,
financial affiliations, executive and board contacts, and all legitimate assets in
support of total sales and profits."'1 7 Another said, "We are morally obligated
to consider those people who have befriended us in the matter of purchases.
Conversely, we feel it just as important to emphasize the fact that when we
need help we should feel free to call upon our commercial friends to help us in
the matter of sales, just as we have helped them.""' On the other hand, the
presidential assistant in charge of reciprocity for the former Liquid Carbonic
Division of General Dynamics Corporation recently said, "Let's not kid our-
11. See Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power, in Business Concentra-
tion and Price Policy, 342-43 (1955).
12. See supra note 4.
13. Other names used to describe the trade relations function are Corporate Sales,
National Sales, Trade Analysis, Customer and Supplier Relations, Corporate Relations, and
National Accounts: Willison, Creating Commercial Friendships Through Trade Relations,
Address to the Chemical Buyers Group of the Nat'l Ass'n of Purchasing Agents at Chicago,
III., Oct. 27, 1960, at 1. Mr. Willison was Director, Trade Relations, Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.
14. McCreary & Guzzardi, supra note 1, at 180.
15. See supra note 4.
16. McCreary & Guzzardi, supra note 1, at 194.
17. Meade, The Trade Relations Function in Modern Business, in Am. Management
Ass'n, Management Bull. No. 19: Trade Relations Defined 1, 4 (1962).
18. See Willison, supra note 13, at 3.
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selves, the ultimate reason for establishing a trade relations department is to
increase sales through the proper application of your purchasing power."'u
All TR men like to emphasize that reciprocity is necessarily only one ele-
ment in a business arrangement and can never override the traditional sales
criteria of price, quality and service. They point out that they always prefix
their pitch with an essential phrase: "All things being equal [meaning price,
quality, and service], we want to be considered." An equitable hearing for their
company is regarded as their most important objective.2 0
However, the protestations of legitimacy and good faith by the practitioners
of this art of "corporate friendly persuasion" have failed to cast off the some-
what hazy, ethical stigma2 1 attached to it by Adam Smith; but, more notably,
they have now incurred the wrath of the federal antitrusters.
Reciprocity has, to some extent, been attacked under three antitrust stat-




The only reciprocity case to date wherein the court found a violation of
section 1 (as well as a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act) is United States
v. General Dynamics Corp.,23 in which Dynamics' 1957 acquisition of Liquid
Carbonic Corporation was struck down. This merger had combined one of the
nation's twenty largest industrial enterprises (Dynamics) and the leader in
the carbon dioxide industry (Liquid Carbonic), allowing General Dynamics to
use its tremendous purchasing power (about $2 billion in 1957) to coerce its
many suppliers who used carbon dioxide to buy their requirements from their
Liquid Carbonic Division.
After holding that reciprocity, whether coercive in nature or based on
mutual patronage, is an anticompetitive practice, the court found that both
parties to the merger fully intended to attempt to foreclose competition by the
use of reciprocity. Pursuant to this intent, they instituted a highly systematized
plan of attack called the "Special Sales Program" and described by one officer
of the defendant corporation as the "dynamite that can blow competition out
of the picture."
2 4
19. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 43 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
20. McCreary & Guzzardi, supra note 1, at 192.
21. Ammer, supra note 6, at 120.
22. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or othervise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby
declared to be illegal . . . ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
23. 246 F. Supp. 156 (1965) (denial of defendant's motion to dismiss), and 258 F.
Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Reciprocal dealing was one of the allegations in United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. 111. 1954), rev'd, 355 U.S. 586
(1957), in which the complaint charged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act
and section 7 of the Clayton Act. The district court found that the allegations were not
proved, and the Supreme Court reversed solely on the basis of section 7 of the Clayton Act,
24. 258 F. Supp. 36, 48-49.
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Applying the provisions of the Sherman Act to this case, the court analo-
gized reciprocity to "tying-in" agreements, which the Supreme Court has held
to be a "per se" violation of section 1 if a "not insubstantial" amount of
commerce is effected. 25 Here, General Dynamics, via the Special Sales Program,
"tied" its purchases from a present or prospective vendor to that vendor's pur-
chases of carbon dioxide from Liquid Carbonic. However, it was held that the
total amount of proven restrained trade due to actual bilateral agreements
between General Dynamics and its suppliers was too inconsequential to warrant
a finding of a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade. But
the court went on to find that, in view of the bilateral intent at the time of the
acquisition to employ the anticompetive device of reciprocity to generate sales
and the "not insubstantial" amount of commerce effected, the merger itself was
violative of section one. At the time of the merger, Liquid Carbonic controlled
approximately thirty-five percent of the carbon dioxide market and the court
found a probability that a minimum of a further five percent would be added to
that market share if the Special Sales Program were permitted to continue in
operation.2 6 Following the Philadelphia National Bank direction that even slight
increases in concentration should be prevented where the industry is already
unduly concentrated,27 the court held that a five percent, probable foreclosure of
competition in the instant case was a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce.
Thus, if a merger in an already concentrated industry creates an oppor-
tunity for reciprocity dealing over even a relatively small segment of the market
and, at the time of the merger, the parties intend to take advantage of the reci-
procity potential, the merger violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. The test
of a "not insubstantial" amount of commerce apparently depends on the level of
market concentration existing prior to the merger-the higher that level is, the
more suspect a given amount of market foreclosure becomes.
B. Section Two
28
In United States v. Griffith, the Supreme Court said:
Large scale buying is not, of course, unlawful per se. It may yield price
or other lawful advantages to the buyer. It may not, however, be used
to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize interstate trade or com-
merce. Nor ... may it be used to stifle competition by denying com-
petitors less favorably situated access to the market.29
This statement points out that either monopolizing or attemping to monopolize
25. Times Picayune Publ. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); International Salt
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
26. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 64-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
27. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 364 (1963).
28. "Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misde-
meanor . . . ." 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1953).
29. 334 U.S. 100, 108 (1948).
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may constitute a violation of section 2, and appears to indicate that, while actual
monopoly power created by reciprocity could be a clear violation of section 2
in view of the definition of such power as the ability to "control prices or ex-
clude competition, '30 a reciprocal buying program may constitute an attempt
to monopolize, even when the firm has less than monopoly power over the mar-
ket. Reciprocal practices can be evidence of the intent, necessary to establish
such an attempt.
31
Section 2 case law concerning reciprocal trading is conspicuous by its
absence. However, the Government recently charged General Motors with using
reciprocity methods to monopolize the locomotive industry.
3 2
Between the time of its entry in 1930 and 1960, General Motors had in-
creased its market share of the locomotive industry in the United States to
eighty-four percent and it was claimed that reciprocal buying had contributed
to this monopoly control. The Department of Justice charged, in part:
General Motors has exercised the monopoly power which it unlawfully
acquired and maintains in the following ways, among others:
(a) by routing its freight traffic so as to remove or reduce the freight
traffic shipped over the lines of railroads which purchased all or a sub-
stantial part of their railroad locomotives from General Motor's com-
petitiors with the purpose or effect of inducing purchases of railroad
locomotives from General Motors.
(b) By giving preference in routing traffic to railroads which purchase
General Motors' railroad locomotives with the purpose or effect of in-
ducing purchases of railroad locomotives from General Motors.
(c) By using, discussing or referring to General Motors' freight ship-
ments when attempting to sell railroad locomotives with the purpose or
effect of inducing actual or potential customers to purchase all or a
large portion of their railroad locomotives from General Motors.33
Although this action has not been pursued in the courts, it serves to illustrate
that reciprocity pressure could, in certain instances, reach criminal proportions
where it is systematically applied to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, an
industry by the foreclosure of competitors.
Presumably, these instances, should they arise, will involve relatively large,
diversified companies which, because of their size and purchasing power, possess
substantial leverage over their smaller suppliers. Generally, the big company, con-
stituting in itself an important market for a great many products, will be much
more important to its suppliers than vice versa and, as a result, can more
30. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (cello-
phane case).
31. Goldstein, Reciprocity-Antitrust Violation by Natural Reaction, 32 Geo. Wash. L.
Rev. 832, 847-48 (1964).
32. United States v. General Motors Corp., Civil No. 63-80, N.D. Ill., Jan. 14, 1963,
5 Trade Reg. Rep. P. 45663 (case 1733), and Criminal No. 61-356, S.D.N.Y., indictment of
April 12, 1961, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. P. 45061 (case 1605), transferred to ND. III., June 7, 1961,
194 F. Supp. 754.
33. Id.
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effectively coerce reciprocal dealings. If G.M. says, "If you scratch my back,
I'll scratch yours," there will be numerous little hands anxious to relieve the
itch on G.M.'s corpulent back. On the other hand, the small firm lacks suffi-
cient market power to enable it to dictate to others.
In any event, it is certain that, in view of the increasing attention being
paid to the expansion of trade relations by the justice Department, TR men,
especially those of the larger companies, will proceed warily in the future, lest
the dubious moral tone now attached to their methods by some businessmen
(particularly those left out in the cold by reciprocal arrangements) should
develop into full-blown criminality.
TmE FEDERAL TRADE ComssIoN ACT
A. Section Five
34
During the 1930's, the FTC decided in three cases that overt and coercive
reciprocity was an unfair method of competition in violation of section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. In the first of these, Matter of Waugh
Equip. Co.,35 executives of Armour & Co., the large meat packing firm, acquired
stock in the Waugh Co., a manufacturer of gears for railroad cars, and proceeded
to use Armour's vast power as a major rail shipper to induce railroad companies
to buy their gears from Waugh. They offered to increase Armour's shipments
by carriers who bought gears from Waugh and threatened to cut off carriers
who did not. Although Waugh was a very minor producer with less than one
percent of the gear market in 1924 when the reciprocity campaign began, it
had achieved industry leadership by 1930 with thirty-five percent of total indus-
try sales.
36
In finding a violation of section 5, the Commission pointed out that other
gear manufacturers made their sales presentations to the mechanical, operating,
and purchasing departments of the railroads, rather than to their traffic de-
partments, and that the factors ordinarily considered by the railroads were
price, quality, and salesmanship. It was further found that the efforts of the
Armour officials on Waugh's behalf sometimes resulted in sales to railroads
against the advice of their technical personnel and in disregard of the bids of
competitors. Those competitors, having no appreciable traffic to offer the rail-
roads, were unable to compete with Waugh on an equal footing.
The Commission concluded that Waugh and the Armour officials had
"taken advantage of a competitive weapon, oppressive and coercive in nature,"
which tended unduly to suppress competition by preventing customers "from
34. "Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful." 38 Stat. 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1964).
35. 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
36. Id. at 242.
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exercising their free will and judgment in determining which device is the most
efficient and will best serve their needs at the lowest net cost over a period of
time."3 7 Waugh had "thus injected an element in the competitive field" which
was "unfair and abnormal" and tended "to reduce the efficiency and economy in
the production and sales methods of competing manufacturers and [give] to the
concern that [controlled] the largest volume of freight traffic an unfair advan-
tage that [would] more than offset the higher efficiency in the production and
sales methods of competing concerns which [controlled] no such traffic."8 8 A
cease and desist order was issued.
A similar case with the same result as that in Waugh was decided the
following year. In Mechanical Mfg. Co.,80 important employees of the large
packer, Swift & Co., along with the Swift estate and members of the Swift
family, controlled Mechanical Manufacturing Co., a manufacturer of railroad
equipment. As in the Waugh case, railroads were persuaded to buy Mechanical's
products by promises of future Swift & Co. business and threats of withdrawal
of existing business. In fact, traffic was actually diverted from railroads that
failed to comply to those that did. The FTC ruled that the practice gave
Mechanical an unfair advantage and was violative of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act.
In 1937, reciprocity was again the basis of the complaint in California
Packing Corp.40 California Packing, a large, diversified food processor and dis-
tributor, sought to promote one of its subsidiaries, Encinal Terminals Corp., a
corporation operating wharves, sheds, warehouses, and switch tracks on San
Francisco Bay for the purpose of handling rail and steamship freight at the
waterfront. By promising, or threatening, to shift their purchases of raw and
manufactured materials, California Packing had induced their suppliers to use
Encinal at the expense of other terminal companies.
The Commission found that the "principal consideration" for California
Packing's purchases from its suppliers became "the volume of tonnage routed
by said industrial concerns through the said Encinal Terminals . . . instead of
the usual and normal competitive considerations such as quality, service, and
price .... "41 This was held an unfair method of competition and California
Packing and its subsidiaries were ordered to cease and desist.
It is clear from the above cases that reciprocity can be an unfair method
of competition. But all three decisions stress the coercive nature of the weapon
and it is doubtful that section 5 can reach tacit or psychological reciprocal deal-
ing in which no threat or suggestion is made, or even intended in some cases.
42
37. Id. at 246, 247.
38. Id. at 247.
39. 16 F.T.C. 67 (1932).
40. 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937).
41. Id. at 398-99.





The current attack on business reciprocity has come under the anti-merger
section of the Clayton Act and coincides with the current movement of the gov-
vernment and the Supreme Court against conglomerate mergers or diversifica-
tion by acquisition."
Conglomerate mergers have been defined as "all acquisitions other than
(1) acquisition by a producer of the stock or assets of a firm producing an
identical product or close substitute and selling it in the same geographical
market-the simple horizontal merger; and (2) acquisition of the stock or
assets of a firm that buys the product sold by the acquirer or sells a product
bought by the acquirer-the simple vertical merger." 45 This term covers the
extension of a product line into a new geographical territory as well as expansion
into new product lines and includes acquisitions in which there are no discern-
ible economic relationships between the businesses of the merging companies and
those that "fit" the operations of the acquirer in some tangible respect. Those
that "fit" occur most frequently because companies intending to expand will tend
to look to those fields with which they have some degree of familiarity, and
where economies and efficiencies through the use of the same production facili-
ties, the same distribution channels, or the same research and development
efforts are possible.
40
Although some commentators have argued the contrary,47 it is now well
settled that the 1950 amendment of section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to con-
glomerate mergers. Chief Justice Warren, relying on the obvious intent of Con-
gress when the section was amended, 48 concluded in the Brown Shoe case that
43. No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject to
the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any
part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may
be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
44. The Federal Trade Commission has said that "there are few greater dangers to
small business than the continued growth of the conglomerate corporation." FTC, The Mer-
ger Movement: A Summary Report 59 (1948).
45. Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 Harv. L. Rev.
1313, 1315 (1965).
46. Id.
47. We have made no recommendations concerning "conglomerate" mergers and
we are inclined to make none .... In view of the comparatively stringent ban on
vertical or horizontal acquisitions by firms with market power, it would seem a
reasonable concession to the advantages of mergers as entry-facilitating devices,
and to the importance of a strong market for assets, to permit conglomerate ac-
quisitions for everyone, perhaps barring some extreme cases where adverse effects
are obvious or the concentration of wealth is huge, e.g., AT & T and U.S. Steel.
Kaysen & Turner, Antitrust Policy 134-35 (1959).
48. "[Tlhe bill applies to all types of mergers and acquisitions, vertical and conglo-
merate as well as horizontal, which have the specified effects of substantially lessening compe-
tition .... or tending to create a monopoly." H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1949).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
"section 7 applied not only to mergers between actual competitors, but also to
vertical and conglomerate mergers .... "49 However, there being neither a com-
petitive nor a buyer-seller relationship between the acquiring and acquired
firms, the tests and standards being applied to block horizontal and vertical
mergers were seen to be inapplicable to conglomerates. And because this type
of acquisition has become the most common form of merger today,50 the govern-
ment and the courts, in their stand against further concentration of American
industry, have lately been faced with the problem of developing legal standards
for testing the legality of conglomerate mergers.
It is hardly surprising that the reciprocity doctrine should have reappeared
on the anti-concentration-of-industry-through-merger battleground when it is
realized that a conglomerate merger increases the opportunity for reciprocity
dealing. It is obvious that a large diversified company can more readily employ
reciprocity than a single-line firm because "a firm which produces a variety of
products is more likely to find a supplier who is also a potential buyer of one
or more of these products than a firm which produces only one.""1 And as
economists Stocking and Mueller observed:
Diversification not only increases the number of opportunities for re-
ciprocal buying; it increases their magnitude. A single-line producer,
even though a near monopolist, may buy so little of some material that
reciprocal buying has little influence on suppliers as potential cus-
tomers. But by diversifying-making other products requiring the
same input-a firm may so enlarge its buying as to give it the power to
increases it sales. Practically all of a giant diversified firm's purchases
of goods and services may achieve importance as a means of increasing
sales.
52
Thus, the larger the purchase, the more likely it is to induce a purchase in
return; the more products available, the more likely it is that the supplier will
find one to suit his needs. A conglomerate merger both increases size and ex-
tends the product-line, thereby enhancing the area of potential reciprocity. It is
for this reason that attacks on reciprocity have been concentrated in the field
of conglomerate mergers.5 3
Reciprocity was charged in the recent Penn-Olin case at the District Court
level 4 but it was held there, inter alia, that the government had failed to show
49. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 294, 317 (1962).
50. One estimate puts them at 70% of the total number of mergers. Barber, The New
Partnership, Big Government and Big Business, The New Republic, Aug. 13, 1966 at 18.
51. Note, The Consolidated Foods Case: A New Section 7 Test for the Conglonzerate
Merger, 49 Va. L. Rev. 852, at 866-67 (1963).
52. Stocking & Mueller, Business Reciprocity and the Size of Firms, 30 J. Bus. U. Chl.
73 (1957), reprinted in Stocking, Workable Competition and Antitrust Policy 287, 292
(1961).
53. Goldstein, supra note 31, at 840.
54. United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963). On
appeal to the Supreme Court, 378 U.S. 158 (1964), the case was returned to the District
Court for further findings on the issue of the elimination of potential competition. See 246
F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965).
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a probable, substantial lessening of competition in the relevant market as a
result of reciprocity arrangements.
Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation and Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation
jointly formed Penn-Olin Chemical Company in 1960 to produce and sell sodium
chlorate in the southeastern United States. To the Government's charge that
an immediate effect of the joint venture would be to make Olin a captive buyer
of sodium chlorate from Penn-Olin, thus preventing other suppliers from ob-
taining any of Olin's business, the court answered:
While Olin's 50% ownership of Penn-Olin does not legally deprive
Olin of the right to continue to buy from (Penn-Olin's competitors),
self-interest might lead Olin to buy from Penn-Olin. But it cannot be
said that as a matter of reasonable probability Olin will do so. Whether
purchasing from Penn-Olin will be to Olin's net advantage depends
upon a balancing of the advantage which will accrue to Olin as a stock-
holder of Penn-Olin as against freight and service disadvantages inher-
ent in shipments from Calvert City instead of a "next-door" supplier.
The record gives no indication how Olin will evaluate these conflicting
considerations.5"
The Government further argued that the pooling of their financial resources
by the joint venturers would greatly enhance their combined purchasing power,
which could be used as a basis for making reciprocal arrangements with ven-
dors who are also sodium chlorate buyers, thus giving Penn-Olin an undue sales
advantage over its competitors. The court admitted that Pennsalt was an "ac-
knowledged practitioner of reciprocity" but was unable to find on the evidence
that, even if Penn-Olin attempted to capitalize on its buying power to further
its sales position, as a matter of reasonable probability it would ultimately domi-
nate the sodium chlorate market. "The Government's forecast that Penn-Olin
will ... ultimately become the dominant factor in the southeast is based on con-
jecture and nothing more."56
Thus, the Delaware court, while acknowledging that reciprocity could be an
anticompetitive practice and that a merger in certain circumstances could open
the door to its utilization, was not prepared to make the mere opportunity for
reciprocity in itself a violation of section 7. Even overt attempts to employ reci-
procity as a sales tool were held to be insufficient unless accompanied by a prob-
able, substantial lessening of competition. The court properly adhered to the
section 7 test of a reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competi-
tion. Mere possibility or conjecture is not enough. If it were, any conglomerate
merger would be illegal, as "there are probably very few industrial mergers of
any size which do not open up some theoretical opportunities to practice reci-
procity.15 7 However, shortly after the Penn-Olin decision was handed down,
55. Id. at 125-26.
56. Id. at 126.
57. Harsha, The Conglomerate Merger and Reciprocity-Condemned Py Conjecture?,
9 Antitrust Bull. 201, 204 (1964).
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another district court took a significant step in the direction of making mergers
which create the opportunity for reciprocal dealing, without more, illegal per se.
In United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Company,"s the country's fourth largest
manufacturer of general industrial machinery was enjoined from acquiring three
companies which manufactured coal mining machinery. The court of appeals,
affirming the district court, stated:
Ingersoll-Rand is a large purchaser of steel and the steel industry con-
stitutes one of the largest present markets for coal . . . . It is not
overly speculative to assume that the judicious use of its steel-purchas-
ing power by Ingersoll-Rand could immeasurably increase the sales
by the acquired companies of machinery and equipment to the coal
mining companies which acutely need the continued good will of the
steel industry. Moreover, the mere existence of this purchasing power
might make its conscious employment toward this end unnecessary;
the possession of the power is frequently sufficient, as sophisticated
businessmen are quick to see the advantages in securing the good will
of the possessor. Certainly the steel producer who seeks orders from
Ingersoll-Rand may tend to prefer the acquired companies as the
source of supply of equipment used in his "captive" mines and the ad-
vantages accruing to him from so favoring the acquired companies
would not have to be pointed out by Ingersoll-Rand. What may here
be involved is the trade practice known as "Reciprocity." This is
particularly destructive of competition because it transforms substan-
tial buying power into a weapon for denying competitors less favor-
ably situated access to the market.59
This language would seem to indicate that the possibility of a large firm using
reciprocity pressure and suasion is sufficiently anticompetitive in itself to bring
a merger which creates such a possibility within the proscription of section 7.
B. The Consolidated Foods Case
The most extensive treatment of the issue of reciprocity in business deal-
ings as it relates to corporate mergers came in the recent Consolidated Foods
case.60
In 1951, Consolidated, a large, diversified processor, wholesaler and retailer
of food products acquired Gentry, Inc., one of the two leading producers of
dehydrated onion and garlic. In 1950, immediately prior to the Consolidated-
Gentry merger, Gentry accounted for twenty-eight percent of dried onion sales
and Basic Vegetables Products Inc., its principal competitor, 60 percent. By
1958, these figures were thirty-five percent and fifty-seven percent, respectively.
58. 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.M. Pa.); aff'd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963).
59. 320 F.2d 509, 524 (3d Cir. 1963), afl'g, 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa.) (Em-
phasis added.). The idea that Ingersoll-Rand could impair competition in the coal mining
machinery industry by inducing the steel companies to persuade their coal suppliers to
buy their machinery needs from Ingersoll is referred to as "secondary reciprocity." See text
accompanying supra notes 5-7.
60. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), rev'g, 329 F.2d 623 (7th
Cir. 1963), rev'g, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961-63 Transfer Binder) 16182 (1962).
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In dehydrated garlic sales, Gentry had fifty-one percent of the market in 1950
and thirty-nine percent in 1958, while Basic's shares were thirty-five percent
for the same years.
Nearly seven years after its consummation, the merger was challenged by
the FTC61 as a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act and struck down be-
cause it gave Gentry "a new and anticompetitive advantage, the mixed threat
and lure of reciprocal buying, which was not available to its competitors and
would tend to foreclose them from a substantial market, and which promised
to further rigidify an already concentrated industry and to discourage new
entrants."
0 2
Commissioner Elman reasoned that reciprocity is necessarily anticompeti-
tive:
It distorts the focus of the trader by interposing between him and the
traditional competitive factors of price, quality, and service an irrele-
vant and alien factor which is destructive of fair and free competition
on the basis of merit.
. . In this situation, it is the relative size and conglomeration of busi-
ness rivals, rather than economic efficiency, that may determine firm
growth and success, and, ultimately the allocation of resources ...
And it is clear that these anticompetitive effects are likely to occur,
given a corporate structure similar to that of (Consolidated) .... 63
Also, by drawing an analogy between reciprocal buying and tying agreements,
i.e., agreements by one party to sell a product to another only on condition that
the buyer also purchase a different product, 4 the Commission left no doubt that
they believe reciprocity, like the tie-in contract, should be per se illegal.
In reaching their decision, they emphasized the structure of the dried onion
and garlic industry and observed that "Section 7 is designed... to 'nip in the
bud' such changes in the structure of an industry, produced by corporate
acquisitions, as are likely to bring about substantial lessening of competi-
tion .... [I]n a Section 7 case ... the inquiry does not focus on overt anti-
competitive trade practices as such, but rather on changes in market or indus-
try structure that are effected by the challenged merger and that may have anti-
competitive consequences."0 0 Since Consolidated, as a result of the merger,
became a seller of dehydrated onion and garlic and was also a purchaser from
food processors who used those ingredients in their products, the Commission
concluded that the merger presented it with an opportunity to make sales in
61. The complaint issued Dec. 18, 1957.
62. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961-63 Transfer Binder)
16182 (1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
63. Id.
64. See International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Inter-
national Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).; Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1 (1958).
65. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (1961-63 Transfer Binder)
16182 (1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
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one product market "on the sheer strength of its buyer power in other mar-
kets" 66 and thus posed a "real and substantial" threat to competition. 7
On the question of substantiality, the Commission was satisfied with the
finding that a minimum of twenty-five percent of the onion and garlic market
could be affected by the acquisition since, in 1958, producers that both supplied
Consolidated and bought from Gentry accounted for at least one-fourth of the
entire industry's output. Add to this figure many other prospective suppliers of
Consolidated who might also have bought from Gentry and "the latent force of
Consolidated's buying power therefore undoubtedly exceeds one-fourth of both
markets by a substantial margin. The area of prospective market foreclosure
is thus not merely significant, but exceptionally large."
8
Thus, providing the test of substantiality can be met (which is not too
difficult in view of the recent Von's Grocery"9 decision), the FTC appears ready
to condemn any merger which creates a potential for reciprocity.
However, on appeal, the Seventh Circuit was persuaded by post-acquisition
evidence that the Commission bad failed to show a probability that the merger
would substantially lessen competition. Judge Castle said:
Undoubtedly there are situations resulting from acquisitions or mergers
in which business reciprocity has the effect of substantially lessening
competition or can be so utilized ....
[But] here ten years of post-acquisition experience-during which
Consolidated attempted overt enforcement of reciprocal buying prac-
tice where it deemed it might be successful-serves to demonstrate
that neither the acquisition of Gentry, in and of itself, nor the overt
attempts to use buying power to influence sellers to Consolidated to
purchase from Gentry resulted in substantial impact on the relevant
market occurred, and absent some factor which requires a different
approach we are of the view that the experience reflected by this post-
acquisition period must weigh heavily in appraising future probabili-
ties.70
The Supreme Court, unanimously reversing the court of appeals, conceded
that post-acquisition evidence was entitled to some consideration but was un-
willing to give it as much weight as was the lower court. After holding "at
the outset that the 'reciprocity' made possible by such an acquisition is one of
the congeries of anticompetitive practices at which the antitrust laws are
aimed,171 Mr. Justice Douglas, delivering the opinion of the Court, cited Brown




69. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), where the Court dig-
allowed a merger of two grocery chains involving 7.5 percent of the retail grocery business
in the city of Los Angeles.
70. 329 F.2d 623, 626 (1964).
71. 380 U.S. 592, 594 (1965).
72. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 294 (1962).
73. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
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the Clayton Act is concerned "with probabilities, not certainties," and declared
that "reciprocity in trading as a result of an acquisition violates section 7 if the
probability of a lessening of competition is shown," 74 He stated further that
"the 'mere possibilty' of the prohibited restraint is not enough." 75
On the face of it, the Supreme Court did not accept the Commission's
position that it was sufficient that the merger resulted in a market structure
which gave Consolidated the power to use reciprocity tactics in the onion and
garlic industries. Thus, doctrinally at least, the Court was attempting to stay
within the confines of section 7-a probability that competition will be substan-
tially lessened. However, a closer examination of the decision, given the facts
of this case, raises some troubling questions regarding the status of section 7
in the Supreme Court.
Mr. Justice Douglas considered that there was substantial post-acquisition
evidence here which confirmed the Commission's finding of a probable, substan-
tial lessening of competition as a result of the merger. He relied mainly on the
alleged fact that Basic's product was superior to Gentry's (which is not sup-
ported by the evidence) and yet Gentry, in a rapidly expanding market, was
able to increase its share of onion sales by seven percent and to hold its losses
in garlic to a twelve percent decrease. But the bulk of the evidence is fully con-
sistant with Gentry's increased onion market share for reasons totally divorced
from reciprocity. Gentry was competitive *in price, quality, and service, the
traditional selling tools in the food industry; a small producer left the industry;
Gentry developed a new processing method, greatly improving its product; the
industry was expanding rapidly due to the increasing consumer demand for de-
hydrated foods using onion and garlic (e.g., dried soups and Italian foods) and
processors desired a second source of supply for their increased requirements.
Further, if it was reciprocity working to increase Gentry's onion market share,
it is difficult to know why it was not working as well in the garlic field, since
both products are made the same way, marketed the same manner, and used in
similar ways by the same customers. The Court chose to answer this query by
agreeing with the Commission that Gentry's share of garlic sales may have fallen
still farther had it not been for the influence of reciprocal buying.76
Words such as "probable" and "substantial," by themselves, are meaning-
less as tests or standards of legality. It is only when they are used by the Court
in the context of a particular fact situation that we can attempt to attach some
substantive significance to them. Both terms signify a matter of degree-
"probable" lies somewhere between "possible" and "certain," and "substantial"
between "some" and "all." Thus, the question is "where along the spectrum do
we find the Supreme Court?" And the answer, suggested by a reading of the
record in this case, is "Very near the low end."
74. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595 (1965).
75. Id. at 598.
76. Id.
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To show that the effect of the threatened reciprocity was substantial, it was
noted that firms which both supplied Consolidated and bought from Gentry con-
stituted twenty-five percent of the onion and garlic markes and, therefore,
approximately one-fourth of the available market stood to be influenced by the
possibility that Consolidated would withdraw patronage unless Gentry was in
turn patronized. But this figure tells us nothing without further proof that
Consolidated had substantial power as a purchaser of food products relative to
the market power of its suppliers (the food processors). Without a showing that
Consolidated did in fact possess leverage over a substantial segment of its sup-
pliers, there is no basis for saying that reciprocity would probably, substantially
lessen competition in one-fourth of the available market. The important con-
sideration, regarding Consolidated's ability, or lack of it, to coerce or induce
food processors to buy from Gentry, is market power in the food industry, not
just in the small dried onion and garlic sub-industries. The evidence here falls
short of showing that Consolidated had the power to coerce a significant seg-
ment of the purchasers who accounted for a substantial share of the onion and
garlic markets. On the contrary, it adequately shows that such power was com-
pletely lacking and, thus, that the merger was not likely to have any substantial
effect on competition. There was evidence, backed by logic, that Consolidated
could not "pressure" national suppliers with widely accepted brand names to
purchase their raw materials from *a particular supplier. Consolidated's pur-
chases from a national packer amounted to a very minimal percentage of the
latter's total sales, 7 7 making the national brands much more important to Con-
solidated than vice versa. Better than eighty percent of Consolidated's pur-
chases came from this type of supplier. Further, the record shows that, for vari-
ous business reasons, even the private label packers were not susceptible to
reciprocity pressures.
It was admitted by Consolidated that reciprocity was tried on occasion,
but the evidence shows than any results realized by the such attempts were
strictly "de minimis" at best. In this connection, Consolidated called witnesses
from approximately twenty-five representative Gentry customers who unequivo-
cally denied that their sales to Consolidated had any connection with their
purchases from Gentry. They testified in detail and repeatedly to very real rea-
sons why reciprocity cannot be an effective market force in the food industry.
It is difficult to understand why this testimony, given under oath by knowledge-
able food company officials, the only individuals who knew the reasons for their
purchases, was not accepted by the Commission or the Court-unless purchas-
ing agents, as well as trade relations men, are considered to be morally or
ethically questionable in their methods of dealing.
As the evidence does not support a finding of a probable, substantial
lessening of competition at all, we are forced to conclude that the Commission
77. In most cases, it was less than one percent.
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and the Court were satisfied with something less because they proscribed the
merger. It is apparent from their language that the Commissioners, at least, con-
demned the potential reciprocity made possible by the merger. It would also
appear that, despite the express language used, the Supreme Court is basically
in agreement with that position and will, in the future, move to block any merger
resulting in a situation conducive to reciprocity.
If this analysis is correct, it means that diversification by acquisition is
illegal wherever the result is potential reciprocity. In turn, this implies a general
proscription of conglomerate mergers which, as previously mentioned, inherently
enhance the area of potential reciprocity. 78
That this is the present situation is lent some weight by the separate con-
curring opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart in the Consolidated Foods case. He too
seemed troubled by the standards of probability and substantiality applied by
the majority. He stressed that the touchstone of section 7 is the probability
that competition will be lessened and implied that the evidence relied upon by
the Court fell short of this mark. He said:
The Act does not require that there be a certainty of anticompetitive
effect. But that does not mean that the courts or the Commission can
rely on slipshod information confusingly presented and ambiguous in
its implications. The law does not require proof that competition cer-
tainly will be lessened by the merger. But the record should be clear
and convincing that the requisite probability is present.
Th;e record in this case is sorely incomplete, and a reviewing court is
given little guidance in determining why this merger should be voided,
if reciprocity-creating mergers are not per se invalid. 9
In any event, he thought that the record contained "just enough" to support
invalidation of the merger, but because of evidence not referred to in the Court's
opinion.8 0
The General Dynamics-Liquid Carbonic merger, discussed previously in
connection with section one of the Sherman Act,81 was the first section 7 reci-
procity decision following the Consolidated Foods case. Proceeding on the
basis that the point of inquiry is the time of the merger and that reciprocity is
an anticompetitive practice, the Court stressed an approach consisting of "an
analysis of the power created by the merger, the likelihood of its implementation,
and the probable competitive consequences of the resulting foreclosure."8 2 How-
ever, as all of these factors were readily apparent here, it was a comparatively
78. See text accompanying supra note 51.
79. FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, at 606 and 607 (1965).
80. He divided the food industry into large suppliers with nationally advertised brands
and smaller packers who packed under Consolidated's private labels and found that
Consolidated could coerce the latter group because of the absence of consumer demand for
their product. Id. at 607.
81. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. Cf. Comment, United States v. General
Dynanmics Corp., 42 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 733 (1967).
82. 258 F. Supp. 36, 61 (1966).
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easy case and not particularly useful to our analysis of the actual standards of
illegality being applied by the courts. The tremendous size and power of General
Dynamics and its systematic application of a special reciprocity program to an
already highly concentrated carbon dioxide industry justified the court in
finding that a merger which resulted in such a program was likely to substan-
tially lessen competition in violation of section 7.
CONCLUSION
In view of the holding in Consolidated Foods and the fact that all of the
reciprocity cases to date have involved a merger or acquisition, it is safe to
assume that the principal vehicle of attack in future reciprocity cases will be
section 7 of the Clayton Act. However, if we accept the position of antitrust
chief Donald F. Turner that all conglomerate mergers are not harmful to com-
petition and that some are even procompetitive,83 it is undesirable to hold that,
because diversification increases the area of possible reciprocal dealing, mergers
which result in a market structure conducive to reciprocity are "per se" illegal.
This is in no way inconsistent with a policy that reciprocity is an anticom-
petitive practice. Even assuming this, we must find affirmative answers to three
additional questions before finding that a given merger violates section 7, which
is an anti-merger, not an anti-reciprocity, provision. First, is reciprocity possible
in the given market situation? Second, if so, will it probably be used? And
third, will its use substantially lessen competition? All of these question can be
answered as of the time of the acquisition, but if post-acquisition evidence is
available no logical reason is apparent for not giving it substantial consideration.
Surely evidence of actual market experience is always preferable to predictions
of probable behavior.
Although a merger might create a market structure conducive to reciprocity,
in that a firm's suppliers have become potential customers, it is only possible to
exploit it where the acquring firm has substantial market power or leverage in
relation to its suppliers. It must be economically important to its suppliers such
that the latter are induced, overtly or tacitly, to exchange purchases with it.
Evidence of this important ingredient was absent in the Consolidated Foods case.
Similarly, merely because reciprocity dealing is possible in a particular
situation does not infer automatically that it will be used. Many firms do not
subscribe to its practice because of the ethical stigma attached to It. Purchas-
ing agents, in particular, don't like it because it inserts a completely alien factor
83. See generally Turner, sutpra note 45; Handler, supra note 9, at 437-38. Some of
these benefits are the maintenance of a strong capital assets market, such that capital assets
are controlled by those who will use them to their utmost economic advantage, thus tending
to maximize society's total output of goods and services; substantial economies of scale in
production, research, distribution, management, and cost of capital; the stabilization of
profits, thereby minimizing the risks of business failure and bankruptcy; an avenue for
industrial growth sometimes less expensive than internal expansion because existing
facilities can be acquired for less than the cost of building them; invigoration of competition
in an industry characterized by oligopolistic lethargy and inefficiency.
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into their purchasing considerations. In general, they consider their function to
be a highly specialized and important one and they take pride in their ability to
drive the best bargain possible in terms of price, quality, and service. Reciprocal
buying reduces their function to little more than an ordering clerk. In this con-
nection, it should be noted also that in most large corporations, purchasing and
sales are separate and autonomous departments. This means that any reciprocity
contacts must necessarily occur at higher levels of managements and be filtered
down through the chain of command to the relevant personnel. But busy
executives with important duties of their own can't have much time to devote
to those of their buyers or salesman. Top management decision-making would
rarely include choosing the supplier from which the tompany's dried onion needs
should be purchased.
In addition to the above anti-reciprocity observations, a trade relations
program is costly. It requires detailed and up-to-date customer records and a
significant degree of co-ordination between purchasing and sales. Some doubt
that the returns justify the cost. In fact, the practice of reciprocity has been
alleged to be inherently unprofitable in that it raises a company's purchasing
costs by (1) weakening supplier price competition, (2) permitting less-than-
average supplier performance in quality and delivery, and (3) promoting sloppy
purchasing by removing the purchaser's incentive to drive the hardest bargain
and thereby contribute to cutting over-all company costs.
Reciprocal dealing is also claimed to affect the sales effort: (1) Salesmen
tend to become complacent and almost always neglect their reciprocal accounts
because they sell them as a matter of course regardless. As a result they often
fail to increase sales to present customers, generally considered to be the best
prospects for new business. (2) Reciprocity tends to downgrade a company and
its product by implying that it must rely on this, in lieu of price, quality and
service in order to sell its product.8 4
Executives are often reluctant to engage in reciprocal arrangements because
of its double-edge potential. If a firm decides to discontinue a supplier previously
working on a reciprocal basis, it will find that it has also lost a customer. And
once a company has gotten into the practice, experience teaches that it is very
difficult to back out.85 Accordingly, many businessmen prefer not to paint them-
selves into such a corner.
Also, reciprocity selling tactics can boomerang on the user. Some purchas-
ing agents, testifying in the Consolidated Foods hearing, when asked if their
firm's sales to Consolidated were mentioned by the Gentry salesman, exhibited
the natural human resentment towards being pressured or bribed and replied
that if he had, he surely would not have received any business. In a similar
vein, Gentry brokers testified that some of the pre-merger Gentry's sales were
84. See Ammer, supra note 6, at 122.
85. Handler, supra note 9, at 435.
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to direct competitors of Consolidated and, in this respect, it was to Gentry's
advantage to prevent disclosure of the acquisition as far as possible. In fact,
there was evidence that Gentry lost sales as a result of its connection with Con-
solidated.
Finally, the most salient argument against assuming that businessmen will
use reciprocity merely because of its availability is the Consolidated Foods deci-
sion itself. By it, the Supreme Court has added one more weapon to its section
7 arsenal-potential reciprocity. Businessmen now know that allegations of
reciprocal dealing can put their merger in a vulnerable position to be struck
down by a minimum of evidence in that regard. Assuming they have economic
reasons, other than the hope of entering into some reciprocal arrangements with
suppliers, for wanting to merge, corporate officers will tread the reciprocity-path
warily in the future to avoid putting their merger in jeopardy for benefits uncer-
tain and incidental to their primary reasons for merging.
The last issue to be resolved in a section 7-reciprocity inquiry, i.e., substan-
tiality, continues to be an elusive concept which the courts have been attempting
to define for some years. Theoretically, a substantial lessening of competition
appears to depend on the degree of concentration already existing in the relevant
industry. The higher the level of concentration prior to the merger, the smaller
the amount of the market that need be affected; and, each case must be decided
in the context of its own fact situation and market structure. All that can be
said at this point is that recent decisions indicate that the government's task
of meeting the issue of substantiality seems to be getting easier.
In sum, the assumption that reciprocity is an anticompetitive practice
and should not be permitted to obfuscate the traditional forms of competition-
price, quality, and service-is only the beginning, and not the end, of a section
7 inquiry.86
86. For an interesting dialogue as to the validity in economic theory of coercive
reciprocity and, consequently, the validity of regulating it under the anti-trust laws, see
Ferguson, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: An Economic Analysis, 30 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 552, 566-80 (1965), and Burrus, Tying Arrangements and Reciprocity: A Lawyer's
Comment on Professor Ferguson's Analysis, 30 Law & Contemp. Prob. 581 (1965).
